Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

(Slip Opinion)

Authority to Withdraw from the

North American Free Trade Agreement

The President may lawfully withdraw the United States from the North American Free

Trade Agreement without the need for any further legislative action.

October 17, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

You have asked whether the President may lawfully withdraw the Unit-

ed States from the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”),

Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), according to its

terms, without obtaining approval from Congress. NAFTA is a congres-

sional-executive agreement, negotiated by the President and approved by

Congress. Article 2205 of the agreement permits a party to withdraw from

it on six months’ notice. In the legislation approving NAFTA, Congress

authorized the President to carry out the agreement and imposed no limits

on his authority to withdraw. Because the Constitution and the governing

statute vest the President with the authority to invoke article 2205 of

NAFTA, we conclude that the President may give notice on behalf of the

United States to withdraw from the agreement without the need for any

further legislative action.

NAFTA is an international agreement among the United States, Cana-

da, and Mexico that created “a ‘free trade zone’ on the North American

continent through the phased elimination or reduction of both tariff and

non-tariff barriers to trade.” Made in the USA Found. v. United States,

242 F.3d 1300, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2001). President George H.W. Bush

negotiated NAFTA consistent with section 1103(b) of the Omnibus Trade

and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (“1988 Act”), Pub. L. No. 100-418,

102 Stat. 1107, 1129–30, which entitled certain trade agreements to the

In preparing this opinion, we have solicited and considered the views of the Depart-

ment of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser. See Memorandum for Henry C. Whitaker,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Michael J. Mattler,

Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Dep’t of State (Dec. 1, 2017).

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

expedited parliamentary procedures of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.

§ 2101 et seq. To qualify for the Trade Act’s procedures, an agreement

must be subject to termination “upon due notice” at the end of a period

specified in the agreement; if the agreement is not terminated at that

time, “it shall be subject to termination or withdrawal thereafter upon not

more than 6 months’ notice.” 19 U.S.C. § 2135(a). President Bush and

the leaders of Canada and Mexico signed NAFTA on December 17,

1992. 32 I.L.M. at 703. Consistent with the Trade Act, article 2205 of

NAFTA provides for withdrawal on six months’ notice: “A Party may

withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice

of withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, the Agreement

shall remain in force for the remaining Parties.” NAFTA art. 2205, 32

I.L.M. at 703.

In 1993, President Clinton submitted to Congress the agreement itself,

a “statement of administrative action” describing the Executive Branch’s

plan for implementing the agreement, and proposed implementing legisla-

tion. H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, vol. 1, at 1–2 (1993). The statement of

administrative action discussed one potential withdrawal scenario. Re-

flecting the importance of supplemental agreements on labor and envi-

ronmental issues to his Administration’s support for NAFTA, President

Clinton advised that if Mexico or Canada ever withdrew from one of

those supplemental agreements, the President would, “after thorough

consultation with the Congress, . . . provide notice of withdrawal under

the NAFTA, and cease to apply that Agreement, to Mexico or Canada.”

Id. at 456. The President did not suggest that notice of withdrawal would

be contingent on congressional approval or any other formal action.

Congress enacted the proposed implementing legislation later that year.

See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

(“NAFTA Implementation Act”), Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057

(1993). In that statute Congress “approve[d]” both NAFTA and the state-

ment of administrative action. Id. § 101(a)(1)–(2), 107 Stat. at 2061

(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(1)–(2)). The Act changed U.S. law to

comply with the international-law obligations that the United States

would assume under NAFTA. The Act also authorized the President, if he

determined that certain conditions had been satisfied, to take steps to

“provid[e] for the entry into force” of the Agreement with Canada and

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

Mexico. 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b). President Clinton took those steps and

NAFTA entered into force among the three countries on January 1, 1994.

Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the

President, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), https://ustr.

gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-

agreement-nafta (last visited October 17, 2018).

II.

The Constitution empowers the President, with the advice and consent

of the Senate, to make treaties. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitu-

tion does not expressly address the procedures by which the United States

may enter other forms of international agreements. But from the earliest

days of the Republic, it has been established that the President may, on

behalf of the United States, “make such international agreements as do not

constitute treaties in the constitutional sense.” United States v. Curtiss-

Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); see Weinberger v. Rossi,

456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) (“We have recognized . . . that the President

may enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without

complying with the formalities required by the Treaty Clause[.]”); see

also Memorandum for Ambassador Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Repre-

sentative, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Legal Counsel, Re: Whether the GATT Uruguay Round Must Be Ratified

as a Treaty at 2–3 (July 29, 1994); Memorandum for the Attorney General

from J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,

Re: Constitutional Aspects of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

at 26 (Nov. 19, 1954).

In some instances, the President may enter into such agreements based

solely upon his own constitutional authority. These agreements include

military truces, agreements to resolve foreign claims, and agreements

recognizing a foreign power. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453

U.S. 654, 679–83 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229–30

(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1937); Louis

Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 219–22 (2d

ed. 1996) (“Henkin”). Such executive agreements may have legal force

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

without any legislative action. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.

396, 415 (2003); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682–83; Whether Uruguay

Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. O.L.C. 232,

244–45 (1994) (“Uruguay Round Agreements”); Presidential Authority to

Settle the Iranian Crisis, 4A Op. O.L.C. 248, 249 (1980).

In other instances, the President may negotiate and conclude an interna-

tional agreement that the full Congress approves through legislation

(either in advance or after the agreement is concluded). Unlike a treaty,

“which in a single instrument both constitutes an international obligation

and may have the force of law, a congressional-executive agreement

taking this form consists of two distinct instruments: the international

agreement . . . concluded by the President, and the authorizing statute to

which it is an incident[.]” Memorandum for Robert F. Hoyt, General

Counsel, Dep’t of the Treasury, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Presi-

dent’s Authority to Terminate or Amend a Certain Congressional-

Executive Agreement at 5 (May 9, 2008) (“2008 Bradbury Opinion”). The

United States has frequently employed such congressional-executive

agreements to assume major international trade obligations. See Uruguay

Round Agreements, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 234–35; Richard S. Beth, Cong.

Research Serv., R44584, Implementing Bills for Trade Agreements:

Statutory Procedures under Trade Promotion Authority 2–3 (2016);

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States

§ 303 reporters’ note 9 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (noting that “agreements on

[tariffs and other trade matters] are now commonly effected by Congres-

sional-Executive agreement”). NAFTA is such an agreement. The Presi-

dent negotiated and concluded NAFTA, and Congress then approved it by

enacting the NAFTA Implementation Act, which authorized the President

to bring NAFTA into force for the United States.

You have asked whether the President may, without obtaining addition-

al congressional authorization, exercise the right of the United States to

withdraw from NAFTA. In the 2008 Bradbury Opinion, we addressed a

similar question in response to a request from the Department of the

Treasury regarding another congressional-executive agreement. Earlier

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

this year, we addressed this issue in another opinion about a different

international agreement.

We provide the same answer today. Where an

international agreement contains defined procedures for termination or

withdrawal and Congress approves the agreement without limiting those

procedures, the President may invoke the right of the United States to

terminate or withdraw under those procedures without the need for addi-

tional congressional authorization. See 2008 Bradbury Opinion at 5.

While there have been fewer occasions to consider the President’s au-

thority to terminate congressional-executive agreements, many prece-

dents support the President’s authority to terminate a treaty pursuant to

its terms. That authority flows from the President’s constitutional respon-

sibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const.

art. II, § 3, which includes the power to execute treaties, see Constitu-

tionality of the Rohrabacher Amendment, 25 Op. O.L.C. 161, 169–70

(2001) (“Rohrabacher Amendment

”); Constitutionality of Legislative

Provision Regarding ABM Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 246, 249 (1996). Thus,

“[w]here the Senate has consented to a treaty that provides for its termi-

nation, it has consented to the President’s implementing that provision,

just as it has consented to his implementing other provisions of the trea-

ty.” 2008 Bradbury Opinion at 6. The termination provisions are “simply

part of the treaty the President is authorized to execute, according to his

discretion.” Id.

The President’s authority to terminate a treaty also follows from his

role as “‘the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole

representative with foreign nations.’” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319

(quoting then-Rep. John Marshall, 10 Annals of Cong. 595, 613 (1800)).

As the Supreme Court has observed, “the historical gloss on the ‘execu-

tive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the

Because this opinion may be published prior to that one, we fully explore the issue

here rather than rely on our prior opinion as precedent.

Bilateral agreements typically provide for a party to “terminate” the agreement; mul-

tilateral agreements typically provide a right of “withdrawal,” since those agreements may

remain in force for other parties. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 245

(3d ed. 2013). The same legal principles that apply to the President’s authority to termi-

nate international agreements apply equally to his authority to withdraw, and so this

memorandum uses the terms interchangeably, as appropriate.

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign

relations.’” Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (quoting Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-

ring)). The President has the “exclusive authority to determine the time,

scope, and objectives of international negotiations.” Unconstitutional

Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy

in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continu-

ing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __, at *4 (Sept. 19, 2011)

(“OSTP”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he President has

the sole power to negotiate treaties, and the Senate may not conclude or

ratify a treaty without Presidential action.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct.

2076, 2086 (2015) (citation omitted).

The President’s exclusive authority over diplomacy extends not only to

the making of treaties, but to their maintenance as well. The Supreme

Court has long recognized that “the execution of a contract between

nations is to be demanded from, and, in the general, superintended by the

executive of each nation[.]” The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,

109 (1801). “‘In the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments, it

is imperative that the United States speak with one voice. The Constitu-

tion provides that that one voice is the President’s.’” Issues Raised by

Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 40 (1990) (quot-

ing Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bill Prohibit-

ing the Export of Technology for the Joint Japan-United States Develop-

ment of FS-X Aircraft (July 31, 1989), 2 Pub. Papers of Pres. George

Bush 1042, 1043 (1989)); cf. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35

(1960) (“The President . . . is the constitutional representative of the

Specifically, the President has the power “to make Treaties, provided two thirds of

the Senators present concur,” under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

The same clause of the Constitution empowers the President to “appoint Ambassadors,”

“Consuls,” and other officers of the United States. Although some appointments require

the Senate’s advice and consent, the President alone has the power to remove the execu-

tive officers he appoints. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (“The

power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of advising

and consenting to appointment[.]”). Just as the textual requirement to obtain Senate

approval for certain appointments does not imply any role for the Senate in removal, so

too the fact that the Senate must concur in a treaty does not give the Senate any necessary

role in treaty termination.

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

United States in its dealings with foreign nations.”). As the Nation’s

chief representative abroad, the President has the authority to determine

whether and when the United States should exercise its right to terminate

treaties.

In evaluating the President’s authority to terminate a treaty without

action by Congress, we place “significant weight” on “accepted under-

standings and practice.” Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091; see NLRB v. Noel

Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (noting that “long settled and

established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper inter-

pretation of constitutional provisions regulating the relationship between

Congress and the President” (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted)); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678–86 (describing “a history of

congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the

President”). In this regard, however, historical practice has evolved over

time. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical

Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773, 788–99, 807–16 (2014). Although the Presi-

dent’s authority to act unilaterally to terminate a treaty is now well

established, there are a number of early examples involving alternative

procedures for treaty termination, including “direct congressional action,

congressional authorization or direction of presidential action, and sena-

torial authorization or approval.” Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign

Relations Law of the United States § 113 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst., Tenta-

tive Draft No. 2, 2017); see also id. § 113 reporters’ note 2 (collecting

examples); Edwin S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–

1984, at 226, 481 n.75 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (similar); Memorandum for the

Secretary of State from Herbert J. Hansel, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State,

Re: President’s Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.-ROC Mutu-

al Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978), reprinted in Termination of Treaties:

The Constitutional Allocation of Power, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,

95th Cong. 395, 400–10 (Comm. Print 1978) (“1978 Legal Adviser

Memo”) (survey of historical practice).

While it would have been convenient had the Founders squarely ad-

dressed treaty termination in the constitutional text itself, we are left with

no such clarity, and the appropriate division of authority between the

President and Congress was hotly debated at the very start of the Repub-

lic. Here, as in other areas, “[a] Hamilton may be matched against a

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

Madison.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 n.1 (Jackson, J., concurring).

After President Washington issued a proclamation to maintain U.S. neu-

trality in France’s war with Great Britain and other European powers,

Hamilton and Madison famously divided over the President’s powers,

including over whether the President could suspend the treaty of alliance

with France without congressional action. Compare Alexander Hamilton,

Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793) (“Hence in the case stated, though treaties

can only be made by the President and Senate, their activity may be

continued or suspended by the President alone.”), reprinted in 15 The

Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 42 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969),

with James Madison, Helvidius No. 3 (Sept. 7, 1793) (“Nor can [the

President] have any more right to suspend the operation of a treaty in

force as a law, than to suspend the operation of any other law.”), reprinted

in 15 The Papers of James Madison 95, 99 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds.,

1985).

When the United States terminated the treaty of alliance with France

five years later, it did so only after an act of Congress. Following the

XYZ Affair, Congress enacted a series of measures to authorize the

Quasi-War with France, one of which included a declaration that “the

treaties concluded with France,” including the treaty of alliance, “shall

not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or

citizens of the United States.” Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578,

578. There was some debate within Congress about whether that step fell

within Congress’s power. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Con-

gress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, at 251–52 (1997). Thomas

Jefferson (siding with Madison’s earlier view) opined that “[t]reaties

being declared, equally with the laws of the U. States, to be the supreme

law of the land, it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can

declare them infringed and rescinded.” Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of

Parliamentary Practice § 52 (Samuel H. Smith 1801). The 1798 exam-

ple, however, “appears to be the only instance in U.S. history in which

the full Congress purported to effectuate a termination directly,” Bradley,

Treaty Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 789, and it might be justified as

incident to the power of Congress to “declare War,” U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 11; see Bradley, Treaty Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 789–90,

799 & n.143; William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

States of America 68 (Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (“Congress alone

possesses the right to declare war; and the right to qualify, alter, or annul

a treaty being of a tendency to produce war, is an incident to the right of

declaring war.”).

The United States terminated two other treaties prior to the Civil War.

In 1846, President Polk requested Congress’s authorization to give notice

to terminate a treaty with the United Kingdom concerning the Oregon

territory. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 790. Al-

though Congress passed an act authorizing the President “at his discre-

tion” to do so, Act of Apr. 27, 1846, ch. 4, 9 Stat. 109, 110, some legisla-

tors stated that the law was unnecessary because the President could act

of his own authority or with Senate consent, see 1978 Legal Adviser

Memo at 403–04; Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1846) (state-

ment of Rep. Smith) (arguing that whether to give notice under the treaty

“is a duty that belongs to the President, and he is responsible to the

people for his discharge of it”). In 1855, after President Pierce announced

his desire to terminate a Navigation Treaty with Denmark, the Senate

alone provided him with authorization. Bradley, Treaty Termination,

92 Tex. L. Rev. at 793; see Franklin Pierce, Second Annual Message

(Dec. 4, 1854), in 5 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the

Presidents 273, 279 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (“Papers of the

Presidents”). Again, some legislators questioned whether congressional

involvement was necessary. 1978 Legal Adviser Memo at 404. Accord-

ingly, prior to the Civil War, the United States had not settled on a clear

In Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 272 (1817), the Supreme

Court referred to the 1798 Act as a “repeal” of the treaty of alliance. But that case ad-

dressed only the domestic effects of abrogating the treaty, where Congress’s authority is

well established, see, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460

(1899); Rohrabacher Amendment, 25 Op. O.L.C. at 169, not whether Congress could

terminate the treaty as a matter of international law. The Supreme Court has never

decided that latter question, nor do we address it here. The 1798 Act led Attorney General

Biddle to suggest that congressional action might be required to denounce a treaty, see

International Load Line Convention, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 123 (1941), but that dictum

does not represent the considered view of the Department of Justice. See, e.g., 2008

Bradbury Opinion at 5 n.1; Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements that Substan-

tially Modify the United States’ Obligations Under An Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C.

389, 395–96 n.14 (1996).

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

understanding as to the role of Congress and which legislative actor, the

Senate or the full Congress, had the authority to authorize the action.

Over the course of time, historical practice shifted towards the view

that the President could terminate a treaty without congressional authori-

zation. In some instances, the President effectuated the termination, but

Congress or the Senate then authorized it. Thus, in 1864, in response to

Confederate raids from Canada, President Lincoln provided notice to

terminate the Great Lakes Agreement with Great Britain, pursuant to the

agreement’s notice provision. See Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Annual

Message (Dec. 6, 1864), in 6 Papers of the Presidents 243, 246; see also

12 Charles I. Bevans, Ass’t Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Treaties and

Other International Agreements of the United States of America: 1776–

1949, at 54 (1971) (“Bevans”) (text of agreement). A fierce debate in the

Senate ensued over whether President Lincoln had exceeded his constitu-

tional powers in doing so and whether Congress could properly ratify his

action.

In the end, however, Congress passed a joint resolution authoriz-

ing the President’s action. Joint Resolution No. 13 of Feb. 9, 1865, 13

In addition to these two examples, President Madison’s Administration exchanged

diplomatic correspondence in 1815 regarding the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on a

commercial treaty between the United States and the Netherlands; although both countries

later disputed the status of the treaty, the United States “successfully argued that it had

been agreed by the Netherlands government and President Madison in 1815 to regard the

treaty as terminated.” 1978 Legal Adviser Memo at 402; see 2 Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1873, at 720–24 (1873). Notwithstanding Madison’s earlier views, his

Administration did not seek or obtain congressional approval. There remains some debate,

however, about whether the United States terminated the treaty, or whether the parties

jointly recognized that the treaty had ceased to have effect. Compare Bradley, Treaty

Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 796–97, with Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties

and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of

National Policy, 54 Yale L.J. 181, 336 & n.127 (1945).

Compare Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1865) (statement of Sen. Davis)

(“[U]ntil it is ratified and confirmed by the action of Congress, as every gentleman

acknowledges, [the President’s notice] has no effect or operation whatever.”), and id.

(statement of Sen. Sumner) (“[A] treaty may be regarded as to a certain extent a part of

the law of the land, to be repealed or set aside only as other law is repealed or set aside:

that is, by act of Congress.”), with id. at 313 (statement of Sen. Johnson) (“We know that

under the Constitution of the United States, the only organ between the United States and

foreign Governments is the Executive. They have nothing to do with the Congress of the

United States or with the judiciary of the United States. The whole foreign relations of the

country . . . are to be conducted by the President.”).

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

Stat. 568. (The President later rescinded the notice of termination before

the six months had expired. See H.R. Doc. No. 56-471, at 33–34 (1900)

(reprinting diplomatic correspondence).) And in 1911, President Taft

gave notice to Russia of his intent to terminate a commercial treaty

according to its terms, and then submitted a resolution for “ratification

and approval” of his action to the Senate. 48 Cong. Rec. 453 (1911).

Congress enacted a joint resolution that “adopted and ratified” the Presi-

dent’s action. Joint Resolution No. 1 of Dec. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627

(1911); Bradley, Treaty Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 795.

That Congress has played a role in terminating treaties does not demon-

strate that the President lacks the unilateral authority to do so. Beginning

with President McKinley in 1899, and growing over time, Presidents

increasingly assumed the authority to terminate a treaty without approval

by the Senate or the full Congress. Over the past century, “unilateral

presidential termination of treaties has . . . become the norm.” Bradley,

Treaty Termination, 92 Tex. L. Rev. at 801. As relevant to the case of

NAFTA, many of these withdrawals have involved commercial treaties.

For example:

• In 1899, President McKinley gave notice to denounce portions of

a commercial treaty with Switzerland, Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat.

587, on the ground that those provisions required trade conces-

sions from the United States that the President deemed contrary to

U.S. policy. See 1978 Legal Adviser Memo at 406.

• In 1936, President Roosevelt notified Italy of his intent to with-

draw from an 1871 commercial treaty, on the ground that his Ad-

ministration wished to take measures against prejudicial trade

control measures imposed by Italy. See id. at 414–15.

• In 1962, President Kennedy gave notice of the termination of a

1902 commercial convention with Cuba pursuant to the terms of

the treaty. See id. at 420–21.

• In 1985, President Reagan gave notice of the termination of a trea-

ty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Nicaragua ac-

cording to its terms. See Treaties Terminated by the President,

2002 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, ch. 4,

§ B(5)(b), at 204.

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

• In 1987, President Reagan gave notice of the termination of the

United States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Convention, on

the ground that it had facilitated tax evasion using accounts and

companies based in the Antilles. See id.

• In 1995, President Clinton gave notice of the termination of a

1980 tax treaty with Malta, on the ground that recent changes in

Maltese law allowed exploitation of the terms of the treaty. See id.

at 203–04; Dep’t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Tax

Treaty with Malta, Treas. RR-717, 1995 WL 685012 (Nov. 20,

1995).

• In 2007, President George W. Bush gave notice to terminate a tax

treaty with Sweden because Sweden had abolished the tax in

question. Dep’t of the Treasury, United States Terminates Estate

and Gift Tax with Sweden, Treas. HP-436, 2007 WL 1724190

(June 15, 2007).

• In 2016, President Obama gave notice to withdraw the United

States from the South Pacific Tuna Treaty in accordance with that

treaty’s withdrawal provision. See Treaty Amendment, 2016 Di-

gest of United States Practice in International Law, ch. 4, § B, at

149 (“2016 Digest of U.S. Practice”).

In view of these historical examples of presidential action, combined

with what has usually been congressional acquiescence, there can no

longer be serious doubt that the President may terminate a treaty in ac-

cordance with its terms. See Validity of Congressional-Executive Agree-

ments That Substantially Modify the United States’ Obligations Under an

Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 389, 395 n.14 (1996) (“[T]he executive

branch has taken the position that the President possesses the authority to

terminate a treaty in accordance with its terms by his unilateral ac-

tion[.]”); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699–708 (D.C. Cir.) (en

banc) (per curiam) (upholding President Carter’s authority to terminate a

mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China according to the treaty’s

terms), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign

After further negotiations, the United States rescinded its notice of withdrawal from

the South Pacific Tuna Treaty also without seeking or obtaining Congress’s approval. See

2016 Digest of U.S. Practice at 150.

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

Relations Law § 113(1) (“According to established practice, the President

has the authority to act on behalf of the United States in . . . withdrawing

the United States from treaties . . . on the basis of terms in the treaty

allowing for such action (such as a withdrawal clause)[.]”); id. § 113

cmt. c (“Since [the end of the 19th century], almost all actions to . . .

withdraw from treaties have been carried out on behalf of the United

States by the President and his or her agents acting unilaterally.” (citation

omitted)); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 339 (“Under

the law of the United States, the President has the power . . . to suspend or

terminate an agreement in accordance with its terms[.]”); Henkin at 213–

14 (explaining that it is now “accepted that the President has the authority

to denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty”); Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting

Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. 1615, 1623 (2018)

(observing that the Senate “knows that presidents claim authority to

invoke withdrawal clauses unilaterally” and “routinely consents to treaties

containing such clauses”). In so concluding, we are mindful of the histori-

cal examples in which Congress or the Senate has played a role in treaty

termination. See, e.g., Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S.

114, 116 (1936). But such examples do not suggest that congressional

approval is always required—especially since it has, as an historical

matter, more often been lacking. The President therefore need not return

to Congress before terminating or withdrawing from a treaty according to

its terms.

There has been comparatively less discussion concerning the Presi-

dent’s authority to terminate or withdraw from a congressional-executive

agreement, as distinct from a treaty. However, we believe that the textual

and structural reasoning described above, as well as the historical prac-

tice, applies “with equal force to the President’s authority to terminate

congressional-executive agreements according to their terms.” 2008

Bradbury Opinion at 6. When the President invokes a termination provi-

sion in a congressional-executive agreement, he is implementing the laws

that Congress has enacted and exercising his own foreign-affairs powers.

In doing so, his powers are “unquestionably expansive, consisting of both

the authority provided by Congress’s authorizing legislation and the

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

President’s considerable independent authority to act in the realm of

foreign affairs.” Id. In that field the President’s action is “‘supported by

the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpre-

tation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who

might attack it.’” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (quoting Youngstown,

343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).

It could be argued that the President may not unilaterally terminate a

congressional-executive agreement because Congress approved the agree-

ment by statute, and therefore, any changes would require a new statute.

That argument parallels one made—ultimately unsuccessfully—in early

debates on the President’s authority to terminate treaties, which may also

have the force of domestic law. See, e.g., Madison, Helvidius No. 3 (“Nor

can [the President] have any more right to suspend the operation of a

treaty in force as a law, than to suspend the operation of any other law.”),

15 Papers of James Madison at 99; Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary

Practice § 52 (“Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the U.

States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the

legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded.”). Here too the

argument fails. As explained above, a congressional-executive agreement

“consists of two distinct instruments,” both the international agreement

and the authorizing statute to which it is incident. 2008 Bradbury Opinion

at 5. When Congress approves an international agreement, that legislative

act does not make the international agreement itself a statute. The interna-

tional agreement remains a “distinct” instrument, id., entered into by the

President “pursuant to his constitutional authority for conducting the

Nation’s foreign affairs,” Uruguay Round Agreements, 18 Op. O.L.C. at

234; see also Bradley, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J.

at 1632–34 (2018) (explaining that congressional-executive agreements

“reflect a combination of congressional and presidential authority” and

that “Congress has no authority to make binding international agree-

ments”). Under international law, the mechanism for communicating

treaty termination is typically “through an instrument communicated to

the other parties” which only “the Head of State, Head of Government, or

Minister for Foreign Affairs are presumed to have the authority to sign on

behalf of the State.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 67.2,

opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The diplomatic

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

responsibility for communicating that notice would rest squarely with the

President.

The President may thus terminate the international-law obligations of

the United States under the terms of an agreement without additional

action by Congress. The President’s termination of the international

agreement will not necessarily suspend the operation of any domestic

implementing legislation. That question will depend upon the terms of the

implementing legislation—whether, for example, Congress has provided

that the statute should cease to have effect upon termination of the inter-

national agreement. The effect of termination on such implementing

legislation, however, is a separate question from whether the President

may terminate the international agreement and thereby relieve the United

States of its international-law obligations. See Bradley, Congressional-

Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. at 1634 (noting that even if imple-

menting legislation remains in force, that “does not itself disallow a

presidential termination” of the international agreement, just as the Presi-

dent may terminate an Article II treaty that has been implemented by

legislation).

It could also be argued that the President must seek congressional ap-

proval in terminating an international trade agreement because Congress

approved the agreement under its broad authority to “regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But many treaties have

dealt with “matters that were subject to legislation,” including interna-

tional trade, Henkin at 195; see also supra pp. 11–12 (discussing exam-

ples), and that fact has never been thought to disable the President from

terminating a treaty without obtaining additional congressional authoriza-

tion. See, e.g., Bradley, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke

L.J. at 1630 (identifying examples from 1936 and 1985). Given the Presi-

dent’s powers in this area, there is no good reason to believe that the

Constitution preserves any greater role for Congress in the termination of

a congressional-executive agreement on international trade than on any

other subject matter. See id. at 1638. It is therefore entirely congruent

with the constitutional design for the President to carry out the termina-

tion provisions consistent with the agreement as approved by Congress.

Finally, the historical practice over the past century once again weighs

in favor of presidential authority. While examples involving congression-

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

al-executive agreements are not as numerous as those involving treaties,

Presidents have invoked the right of the United States to withdraw from

such agreements on a number of occasions. In 1975, the Ford Administra-

tion gave “notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from

the International Labor Organization” (“ILO”), which the United States

had joined pursuant to a congressional-executive agreement, in accord-

ance with a provision in the ILO constitution requiring two years’ notice

of withdrawal. Membership and Representation, 1975 Digest of United

States Practice in International Law, ch. 2, § 4(C), at 71 (quoting Secre-

tary of State Kissinger’s letter to the ILO).

The authorizing legislation

did not limit the President’s authority to withdraw, and President Ford did

not seek congressional approval. 1978 Legal Adviser Memo at 423. In-

deed, it appears that “the issue of Congressional approval was not raised

in either House of the Congress, despite the fact that a number of mem-

bers of the Senate and House did not favor withdrawal from the ILO.” Id.

Similarly, in 1983, without seeking congressional approval, the Reagan

Administration gave notice to withdraw the United States from the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”)

in accordance with “the terms of Article Two Paragraph Six of the

[UNESCO] Constitution.” Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of

State, to Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, Director General, UNESCO (Dec. 28,

1983), reprinted in 84 Dep’t of State Bull. 41, 41 (Feb. 1984); see also

Amendments to the Constitution of the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization, Dec. 8, 1954, T.I.A.S. No. 3469

(amending UNESCO constitution to provide for withdrawal upon notice).

As with the ILO, Congress had approved U.S. membership in UNESCO

by statute. See Pub. L. No. 79-565, § 1, 60 Stat. 712, 712 (1946) (codified

The United States joined the ILO in 1934. See Pub. Res. No. 73-43, § 1, 48 Stat.

1182, 1182 (1934) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 271); Proclamation of President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, Sept. 10, 1934, 49 Stat. 2712 (1934). The ILO constitution was later amended

to add a withdrawal provision, and the President submitted the amended constitution to

Congress, which approved it. See Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of

the International Labor Organization, annex art. 1(5), Apr. 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 3485, 3494

(providing that “[n]o Member . . . may withdraw from the [ILO] without giving notice,”

and that such notice “shall take effect two years after the date of its reception”); H.R. Rep.

No. 80-1057, at 10 (1947) (transmittal of the amended constitution); Pub. L. No. 80-843,

§ 1, 62 Stat. 1151, 1151 (1948) (congressional approval).

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

at 22 U.S.C. § 287m); Constitution of the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization, Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495, 2519

(1946). President Reagan’s notice took effect, and the United States

withdrew, on December 31, 1984. See Message to the Congress Transmit-

ting the Annual Report on International Activities in Science and Tech-

nology (Mar. 20, 1985), 1 Pub. Papers of Pres. Ronald Reagan 319, 321

(1985).

The United States rejoined UNESCO in 2002. See Address to the Unit-

ed Nations General Assembly in New York City (Sept. 12, 2002), 2 Pub.

Papers of Pres. George W. Bush 1572, 1572 (2002). On October 12, 2017,

the Trump Administration again gave notice that the United States intend-

ed to withdraw. See Heather Nauert, Dep’t of State, Press Release, The

United States Withdraws from UNESCO (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.

state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/10/274748.htm (stating that, “[p]ursuant to

Article II(6) of the UNESCO Constitution, U.S. withdrawal will take

effect on December 31, 2018”). Once again, the President did not seek

congressional approval.

Presidents have also terminated international agreements for which

Congress provided advance statutory authorization, without seeking

congressional approval for the termination. See, e.g., Diplomatic Note to

the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, Mexico, from the U.S. Embassy at 1

(June 28, 2012) (notice to terminate 1972 agreement on screwworm

eradication); Diplomatic Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

from the U.S. Embassy at 1 (Dec. 17, 2004) (notice to terminate 1987

textile trade agreement); U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release, U.S.

Files WTO Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies (Oct. 10,

2004) (notice to terminate 1992 agreement implementing 1979 agreement

on trade in civil aircraft); Proclamation No. 2763, 12 Fed. Reg. 8866,

8866–67 (1946) (notice to terminate five bilateral trade agreements);

Bradley, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. at 1638 &

n.95 (citing examples from the Johnson, Eisenhower, and Truman Admin-

istrations); Randall H. Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive

Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 Minn. L. Rev.

879, 880–81 n.7 (1958) (collecting additional examples).

Some of those

For the respective statutory bases of these congressional-executive agreements, see

21 U.S.C. § 114b (1970) (screwworm agreement); 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982) (textile agree-

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

actions concerned termination by mutual consent of the parties or by the

supersession of a later agreement. See, e.g., 2016 Digest of U.S. Practice

at 477 (supersession of 1960 U.S.-Mexico air transportation services

agreement by new agreement); 49 U.S.C. § 1462 (1958) (statutory basis

for 1960 agreement). But even these precedents illustrate the established

practice of the President ending congressional-executive agreements

without involving Congress.

While history provides ample precedent for the President’s authority to

withdraw without congressional approval, it is also true that, as with

treaties, there have been instances where Congress purported to direct the

termination of congressional-executive agreements. The Comprehensive

Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, for example, provided that “[t]he Secretary

of State shall terminate” an air services agreement with South Africa, Pub.

L. No. 99-440, § 306(b)(1), 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, an agreement which

Congress had authorized, see 49 U.S.C. § 602 (1940). The Secretary of

State then terminated the agreement. See South African Airways v. Dole,

817 F.2d 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also infra p. 23 (discussing

example in which Congress purported to reserve for itself the power to

“annul” mail privileges Congress authorized the President to extend to

Mexico and Canada by international agreement); Walter McClure, Inter-

national Executive Agreements 29 (1941) (noting congressional authoriza-

tion in 1923 for the termination of certain executive agreements relating

to the Panama Canal, which Congress had ratified). But, as with treaties,

such examples suggest only that Congress has sometimes sought to play a

ment); 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c)(10) (1982) (aircraft trade agreement); 19 U.S.C. § 1351

(1940) (bilateral trade agreements). In addition to these examples, President Kennedy

gave notice in 1962 to terminate a 1934 trade agreement with Cuba. 1978 Legal Adviser

Memo at 421; see also 6 Bevans at 1163 & n.5. The 1934 trade agreement was a congres-

sional-executive agreement: President Roosevelt had entered into it pursuant to the Tariff

Act of 1930. See Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Cuba-U.S., Aug. 24, 1934, 49 Stat. 3559,

3559 (1936); see also id. art. XVII, 49 Stat. at 3568–69 (termination provision). The

United States and Cuba had suspended the 1934 trade agreement in 1947 but had reserved

each country’s right to terminate it. See Exclusive Agreement Between the United States

of America and the Republic of Cuba Supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade, Cuba-U.S., ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 3699, 3700; Exchange of Letters,

Cuba-U.S., Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1703, in 6 Bevans at 1231–33. When President

Kennedy terminated the agreement pursuant to that reservation of rights, he did so

without seeking congressional approval. 1978 Legal Adviser Memo at 421.

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

role in the process, not that congressional approval is necessary. Where

Congress has not sought to involve itself in the process, the President is

not constitutionally required to seek congressional approval before invok-

ing the terms of a congressional-executive agreement to terminate or

withdraw from the agreement.

III.

In view of the principles discussed above, we have no difficulty con-

cluding that the President has the authority, without further action by

Congress, to give notice on behalf of the United States to withdraw from

NAFTA according to its terms. NAFTA contains an express mechanism

for withdrawal, and nothing in the NAFTA Implementation Act or any

other statute purports to limit the President’s authority to carry out that

mechanism.

President Bush conducted the negotiations that led to NAFTA under the

authority granted to him by Article II and consistent with the procedures

specified by Congress to make the trade agreement eligible for fast-track

consideration, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902–2903, and he signed NAFTA on

behalf of the United States in 1992. NAFTA provides that “[a] Party may

withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice

of withdrawal to the other Parties.” NAFTA art. 2205, 32 I.L.M. at 703.

Congress “approve[d]” NAFTA in its entirety and without reservation,

including article 2205. See 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(1). Pursuant to the

NAFTA Implementation Act, id. § 3311(b), President Clinton directed an

exchange of notes with Canada and Mexico and provided for NAFTA’s

“entry into force on January 1, 1994.” Memorandum on Implementation

of NAFTA (Dec. 27, 1993), 2 Pub. Papers of Pres. William J. Clinton

2206, 2206 (1993).

As the constitutional actor with “exclusive prerogatives in conducting

the Nation’s diplomatic relations,” OSTP, 35 Op. O.L.C. __, at *4, the

President may invoke NAFTA’s withdrawal provision on behalf of the

United States to communicate the notice of withdrawal to Canada and

Mexico. The President’s role as the agent of the United States in conduct-

ing diplomacy, coupled with his constitutional responsibility to execute

the laws, justifies “presum[ing] (at least absent evidence to the contrary)

that Congress, in approving an international agreement . . . , intended for

the President to administer the agreement in accordance with its terms.”

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

2008 Bradbury Opinion at 8 (citing Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 708). No

language in the NAFTA Implementation Act limits his authority to do so,

or rebuts the presumption that, “in approving an international agreement”

like NAFTA, Congress “intended for the President to administer the

agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. A presidential act withdraw-

ing from NAFTA under the terms of article 2205 would therefore be

supported by both the President’s own independent foreign-affairs author-

ity and Congress’s approval through the NAFTA Implementation Act—

putting the President’s authority at its constitutional zenith. See Youngs-

town, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Other provisions in the statute confirm that Congress left the President

broad discretion to implement the agreement. Congress expected the

President, for example, to exchange notes with Canada and Mexico to

make NAFTA effective, and to determine whether those countries had

implemented sufficient changes to their domestic laws to permit NAFTA

to enter into force. 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(1)(A). Congress charged the

Executive Branch with administering NAFTA and its authorizing statute

through appropriate proclamations, regulations, and other executive

action. Id. §§ 3314, 3331, 3332(q), 3372. Congress’s broad delegations to

the President of the authority to take action consistent with NAFTA and

its implementing statute presumptively include the power to invoke the

agreement’s withdrawal provision. See 2008 Bradbury Opinion at 8. The

delegations reflect “congressional acceptance of a broad scope for execu-

tive action,” Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677, in the administration of

NAFTA, including in making determinations about whether and when to

withdraw from that agreement.

Indeed, far from restricting that authority, the relevant provisions of the

NAFTA Implementation Act authorize the President to take any and all

actions consistent with NAFTA’s terms. In the Act, Congress “ap-

prove[d]” “the statement of administrative action” that President Clinton

submitted along with NAFTA. 19 U.S.C. § 3311(a)(2). That statement had

explained that the President would, after “consultation” with Congress,

invoke article 2205 to withdraw the United States from NAFTA if Mexico

or Canada failed to abide by three supplemental agreements. H.R. Doc.

No. 103-159, vol. 1, at 456. And even that pledge to consult with Con-

gress before withdrawing from the agreement was not compelled by

anything in the NAFTA Implementation Act. The Act requires the Presi-

dent to consult with Congress in many instances before exercising his

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

authority to proclaim tariffs and other matters under the NAFTA Imple-

mentation Act. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3313(a). But the Act does not call

for consultation before the President makes a decision to withdraw from

NAFTA. The NAFTA Implementation Act thus confirms that the Presi-

dent may withdraw from the Agreement without obtaining congressional

approval.

Had Congress sought to restrict the President’s discretion in this regard,

it would have said so expressly. The NAFTA Implementation Act is filled

with provisions anticipating that NAFTA might cease to be effective as

between the United States and Canada or Mexico (e.g., through withdraw-

al). Yet none restricts the President’s power to invoke NAFTA’s with-

drawal provision. Section 2, for example, generally defines the term

“NAFTA country” to mean:

(A) Canada for such time as the Agreement is in force with re-

spect to, and the United States applies the Agreement to, Canada;

and

(B) Mexico for such time as the Agreement is in force with re-

spect to, and the United States applies the Agreement to, Mexico.

19 U.S.C. § 3301(4). Section 109(b), entitled “Termination of NAFTA

Status,” provides that, “[d]uring any period in which a country ceases to

be a NAFTA country, sections 101 through 106 shall cease to have effect

with respect to such country.” Id. § 3311 note. Section 415 similarly

provides that title IV of the NAFTA Implementation Act, governing

dispute resolution between the parties to the agreement, generally “shall

cease to have effect” with respect to a country “on the date on which a

country ceases to be a NAFTA country.” Id. § 3451; see also NAFTA

Implementation Act § 203(b)(1), 107 Stat. at 2088 (amending 19 U.S.C.

§ 1311 to provide a rule for drawback of certain duties “[i]f Canada

ceases to be a NAFTA country”); id. § 203(b)(2)(B) & (C), (b)(3),

(b)(4)(B), (b)(5)(A)(i), 107 Stat. at 2089–91 (making similar amendments

We note that there is at least one statement in the legislative history suggesting that

congressional approval may be required. See 139 Cong. Rec. 29,784 (1993) (statement of

Rep. Franks) (“[U]nder article 2205, each country has the opportunity to withdraw from

NAFTA. All it would require for U.S. withdrawal, is a vote of the Congress and 6 months

[sic] notice.”). That statement, however, finds no support in either article 2205 or the

NAFTA Implementation Act, so we do not rely upon it.

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

to other provisions). Congress plainly anticipated these possibilities, yet

did not purport to restrict the President’s authority to bring them about.

Congress in fact has acknowledged the President’s authority to exercise

the termination right of the United States under the free trade agreement

with Canada that preceded NAFTA. Before reaching the NAFTA deal, the

United States and Canada entered into a bilateral free trade agreement,

CFTA, which Congress approved by statute. See United States-Canada

Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 (“CFTA Implementa-

tion Act”), Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 101(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1851, 1852 (codi-

fied at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note). The agreement allowed either party to

terminate on six months’ notice if the parties failed to agree in the future

on revised rules for certain duties. United States-Canada Free-Trade

Agreement, Can.-U.S., art. 1906, Dec. 22, 1987–Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M.

293, 390. Section 410(a) of the implementing law required the President

to submit a report “if the President decide[d] not to exercise the rights of

the United States . . . to terminate” the agreement under that provision.

102 Stat. at 1897. No provision of the CFTA Implementation Act express-

ly conferred upon the President the authority to exercise the right of the

United States to terminate, but this reporting requirement unequivocally

confirms that Congress believed such authority rested with the President.

There is every reason to think (and no reason to doubt) that Congress

embraced a similar understanding with respect to the United States’

parallel withdrawal right under NAFTA.

The 1988 Act and the Trade Act of 1974 are similarly consistent with

this understanding of the President’s withdrawal authority. NAFTA’s

negotiations were consistent with the statutory frameworks, and it was

approved under both statutes. Section 125(a) of the Trade Act requires

that trade agreements “entered into under [the Trade Act] shall be subject

to termination, . . . or withdrawal, upon due notice, at the end of a period

specified in the agreement.” 19 U.S.C. § 2135(a). Section 125(b) provides

the President with broad authority to “at any time terminate . . . any proc-

lamation made under” it, but does not speak to the termination of trade

agreements. Id. § 2135(b). In both the Trade Act and the 1988 Act, Con-

gress specified that congressional approval would be required for certain

kinds of trade agreements to “enter into force with respect to the United

States.” Id. §§ 2112(e), 2903(a)(1). Congress did not, however, reserve a

similar role for itself in the process of withdrawing from any such agree-

ments. Indeed, “[v]arious forms of this trade legislation date back at least

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

to the Trade Act of 1930, and yet in the succeeding eighty-eight years

Congress has never sought to limit presidential termination in this legisla-

tion.” Bradley, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 Duke L.J. at

1635. And section 102(a) of the Trade Act encourages the President “to

take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power (including the full

exercise of the rights of the United States under international agree-

ments)” to eliminate distortions of international trade, once again reflect-

ing the background assumption that the President “exercise[s] . . . the

rights of the United States” under its international agreements. 19 U.S.C.

§ 2112(a).

In other cases, Congress has been explicit when it sought to play a role

in the termination of international agreements authorized by statutes. “For

example, in 1960 Congress authorized the President to enter into postal

agreements with Mexico and Canada that would extend to those nations

the privilege of transporting mail over United States territory.” 2008

Bradbury Opinion at 9. Congress “provided that ‘the President or Con-

gress may annul the privilege at any time.’” Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 86-

682, sec. 1, § 6103, 74 Stat. 578, 688 (1960)). That and other examples

demonstrate that Congress “is readily capable of indicating its intention to

have a role by statute in the termination of agreements it has authorized.”

Id. Yet it did not do so in implementing NAFTA.

We conclude therefore that, consistent with long-standing executive

branch practice and the NAFTA Implementation Act, the President may

invoke article 2205 of NAFTA to withdraw from the agreement in six

months, without obtaining congressional approval. That withdrawal, once

it took effect, would mean that the United States is no longer bound by

NAFTA as a matter of its international obligations.

IV.

Withdrawing from NAFTA would also have consequences under U.S.

domestic law. For instance, many provisions of the NAFTA Implementa-

tion Act apply to “a NAFTA country” or “NAFTA countries.” See, e.g.,

19 U.S.C. §§ 3311 note, 3333, 3334, 3335, 3371, 3372, 3391(b)(1). Sec-

Because Congress did not purport to limit the President’s authority to terminate

NAFTA, we have no occasion to address constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to do

so.

42 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 17, 2018)

tion 2(4) provides that Canada and Mexico are each a “NAFTA country,”

and thus entitled to receive certain trade benefits prescribed throughout

the Act, “for such time as the Agreement is in force with respect to, and

the United States applies the Agreement to,” each country. Id. § 3301(4)

(emphasis added). After withdrawing from NAFTA, the United States

would no longer be “appl[ying]” the agreement to either country, and

therefore, they would cease to be NAFTA countries for purposes of the

Act.

The fact that the President’s invocation of article 2205 could trigger

that event is unremarkable. When the President terminates a self-

executing treaty, the domestic-law consequence is similar, and the

Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress may authorize the

President to execute the law in a manner that terminates the legal effect

of statutory provisions. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S.

649, 690–91 (1892) (discussing “the sanction of many precedents in

legislation” that “invest the president with large discretion in matters

arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce

with other nations”); see also, e.g., The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830, 830

(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 10,585) (Story, Circuit Justice) (upholding the

President’s statutory authority to drop trade restrictions against Great

Britain and France upon finding that those countries had modified edicts

harmful to U.S. trade); Department of Defense Appropriations Act,

1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8105(d)(2), 104 Stat. 1856, 1902 (1990)

(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note) (authorizing the President

to waive statutory limits capping the number of troops stationed in

Japan); 22 U.S.C. § 2370a(g) (providing that the President may “waive”

prohibitions on foreign assistance to foreign nations that wrongfully

expropriate property of Americans); 50 U.S.C. § 4305(a) (authorizing

the President to “suspend” prohibitions on trade with an ally of an ene-

my of the United States during wartime). Thus, in providing notice

under article 2205, the President would be acting pursuant to the terms

of the agreement and would be both carrying out legislation that Con-

gress properly authorized him to implement and exercising his foreign-

affairs powers. He would be executing the laws, not unmaking them.

Finally, while the President’s authority to withdraw under article 2205

is based upon his Article II authority, in addition to the statute, the Su-

preme Court has made clear that in the field of foreign affairs, Congress

may delegate broad discretion to the Executive. When the President acts

Authority to Withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement

“as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international

relations,” the Constitution does not require Congress “to lay down nar-

rowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed.”

Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320, 322; see also Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at

2089 (recognizing that, under Curtiss-Wright, “Congress may grant the

President substantial authority and discretion in the field of foreign af-

fairs”); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he

strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to the President

over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in

external affairs.”). Many volumes “of the United States Statutes contain[]

one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the

President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either

leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a

standard far more general than that which has always been considered

requisite with regard to domestic affairs.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at

324.

In this opinion, we do not address the full range of domestic-law impli-

cations that would follow from the United States’ withdrawal from

NAFTA. Please let us know if we can be of any further assistance in this

or any other regard.

STEVEN A. ENGEL

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel